on marx's method 2

One more comment on Hegel before we move on to Marx:

There is a section titled "With What to Begin?" right after Introduction in Science of Logic - a.k.a Larger Logic - and there you can find Hegel's long discussion of the issue of 'starting point' in logic. I think one of the main lessons there is that 'the point of departure in reality' is for Phenomenology, and 'the logical starting point' is for Logic. (Patrick Murray (2000) understands the difference between Phenomenology and Logic in relation to the starting point in this way.)

Now turning to Marx:

As we already know so well, in Grundrisse Marx mentions two conceptual journeys, a descending one from the chaotic concrete to the abstract and a ascending one from the abstract to the concrete with many determinations; and he dubs the latter as an "obviously scientifically correct method," i.e. the abstract as an obviously scientifically correct starting point.

And as we remember, Nicolaus argues in his Preface that Marx changed his mind in Capital. InGrundrisse, the argument goes, Marx begins with an abstract category of 'production', but in Capital he abandons this method and starts with commodity. That is, for Nicolaus the category of commodity is something concrete. Of course, opposing view followed of Marquit (1977) and Carver (1980).

The controversy here is how to understand the nature of commodity as a theoretical category. On this respect, I think Chris Arthur's explanation is very interesting. He gives three criteria for the starting point: it should be i) simple, ii) historically specific, and iii) immediate. And he says that commodity satisfies the latter two but not the first; it is not simple enough since it can be further analyzed into use-value and value. What about 'value'? According to Arthur it satisfies the first two but not the third; it is not something that can be immediately grasped. Then what is the true starting point in Marx? Commodity or value?

Here we have Jairus Banaji (1979)'s wonderful solution to this puzzle: a concept of 'double starting-point' which Arthur accepts. According to Banaji, “the beginning is a movement between two points of departure.” The idea is that the commodity forms the analytic point of departure to arrive at the concept of value; and value as the ground of all further conceptual determinations (money, capital) forms the synthetic point of departure of Capital. I think this solution is also in line with Hegel's method having two distinctive starting-points.

Understood in this way, I think both of the two conceptual journeys described in Grundrisseconstitute Marx's method.

Finally, returning to our initial concern with the above discussions in mind, I think Marx's distinction between 'method of inquiry' and 'method of presentation' can be mapped into as follows:

*method of inquiry (Marx of Capital) = descending journey from the concrete to the abstract (Marx of Grundrisse) = analytical method (Hegel) = analytical shift from commodity to value (Banaji & Arthur)

-> commodity as a starting point

*method of presentation (Marx of Capital) = ascending journey from the abstract to the concrete (Marx of Grundrisse) = synthetic method (Hegel) = synthetic shift from value to commodity, money, and capital (Banaji & Arthur)

-> value as a starting point

on marx's method 1

'The starting point' and 'method of inquiry & presentation' theme are ones of the most important methodological issues in the initial chapters of CapitalVol.1 which have troubled Marxian scholarship so long. We could easily agree that questions of 'where to start' and 'how to proceed' are the two most grounding issues when we analyze something scientifically. So was the case with Marx whose object of analysis is capitalism.

I think there are two primary references in dealing with this subject; Hegel's Logic and the chapter on the method of political economy in Grundrisse. I think Marx either consciously borrowed or was heavily influenced by Hegel's method in Logic, and used the example of analyzing a given country starting with its population in showing how to apply Hegel's method in doing social science. (In this respect, I totally agree with Lenin in insisting that without reading Hegel's Logic one barely understands Marx's Capital, and that the latter is the best application of the former.)

Notice that the conceptual proceed of 'Being - Essence -Concept' in Hegel's Logic corresponds that of 'chaotic concrete - thin abstract - concrete with many determinations' in Grundrisse. We could also compare logical developments in Capital such as 'commodity - money - capital' or 'exchange value (immediately perceived) - value (as underlying essence) - exchange value (conceived in thought as form of appearance of value)' ('homology thesis', an argument that there is an one-to-one correspondence between Hegel's system and Marx's system. Of course the concrete correspondence is different from scholars to scholars. For example some argue that the category of 'capital' in Marx corresponds to that of Essence, not of Notion, in Hegel, excluding Notion from homology.)

First on Hegel's Logic: Hegel starts his Shorter Logic with mentioning how difficult it is to begin in doing philosophy. Here's what he says.

"But with the rise of this thinking study of things [i.e. philosophy], it soon becomes evident that thought will be satisfied with nothing short of showing the necessity of its facts, of demonstrating the existence of its objects, as well as their nature and qualities. Our original acquaintance with them is thus discovered to be inadequate. We can assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary and underived, makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were impossible to make a beginning at all." (Hegel's Shorter Logic §1)

Yet, we have to start anyway and the first mode of knowledge we form in our mind is concrete and empirical image established through empirical observation. However, Hegel criticizes empirical science, empirical knowledge for its shallowness and being contained in sense-perception, and argues that knowledge should be pursued beyond. But, he does not reject it all together but incorporates it within the totality of history of philosophy as an element constituting the latter. (This is a superior aspect of Hegel's 'wholistic' systematic philosophy.)

On the other hand, however, Hegel's system of Logic starts not with something empirical, i.e. something concrete-complex but with the category of Being, which is something abstract-simple, and which can be obtained (from the initial empirical perception) through some sort of thought process, i.e. reflection, and proceeds towards more concrete-complex categories, Essence and Notion. Then what is Hegel's true starting point; the concrete-complex empirically given or the abstract-simple?

Before answering this question, notice that there are two movements working in Hegel's system: First from the empirical concrete-complex to abstract-simple, and the second from the abstract-simple to the concrete-complex. Hegel calls the first movement the Analytical Method and the second the Synthetic Method (for definition of each refer to Hegel's Shorter Logic §227and §228).

From this we could easily figure out that there should be two different starting points in Hegelian logic for two different Methods; 'the point of departure in reality' for the Analytical Method and 'logical starting point' for the Synthetic Method.

A Rise in Gold Price and Marx's Theory of Money

Last week saw the gold price skyrocketing over $1,250 per ounce, the highest price ever. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the connection between money and gold has officially disappeared. However, the demand for gold as a storage of value continued to exist; especially so in times of crisis. And we have observed the price of gold soaring during the last couple of years marked by consecutive blows of financial crisis and sovereign crisis with tumbling euro and stagnating dollar. Does this lend support to Marx's commodity money theory, as presented in the first three chapters, to any meaningful extent?

As is well known, there are largely two responses within Marxian camp to Schumpeterian critique of Marx's money theory as metallist and thus outdated:

1) To dismiss the current sovereign money regime as a superficial, temporary and unstable phenomenon (e.g. Claus Germer 1999, Anitra Nelson, John Weeks 2012).

2) To reject the traditional Marxian commodity money theory and modify Marx in a very similar way with Post Keynesian Chartalism and hence in this approach an emphasis is given to the combination of money theory and state theory (Duncan Foley's 1983, 1987 pieces are the most prominent examples).

3) To argue that within Marx's theory, it is not a logical necessity that money needs to have intrinsic value despite Marx's assertion; non-commodity - e.g. fiat money anchored on state power or credit money backed by issuer's creditworthiness - can possibly function as money. Consequently, the post gold exchange regime does not pose a threat to Marx's theory (e.g. Michael Williams 2000, Fred Moseley 2010 etc.).

One of the important theoretical concerns in this debate is whether money itself necessarily has to have an intrinsic value or not within Marx's theoretical system. I think the recent soaring of gold price gives us some insights to this question in relation to the stability of the value of money. First, an institutional environment, where valueless non-commodity performs essential functions of money such as measure of value and storage of value, cannot avoid experiencing a disruption in the value of money now and then, especially in times of crisis. Second, if the circulation of non-commodity money relies upon the state whose credibility depends on its military and financial power and thus is subject to fluctuation, then something like the recent rise in the demand for gold at the expense of government-printed money or government bond may be repeated in a much more violent way anytime in the future.

Jun 15 2010